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Abstract: In Derrida’s reflection on hospitality, the figures of Oedipus and Antigone 
play a decisive role. Derrida describes Oedipus as being anomos, an outlaw, since he 
transgresses the established nomos. According to Derrida, both Oedipus and Anti-
gone are involved in an unsolvable tension between conditional and unconditional 
hospitality. A closer look at Sophocles’ Antigone, however, fits poorly with this unders-
tanding of the relation between hospitality and the nomos. Arguing against Derrida, 
I propose a phenomenological reading of Antigone’s actions as an attempt to disclose 
her suffering with the community. In this way, she demands hospitality neither for her-
self nor for her infinitely removed father but for the world disclosure that she embo-
dies. Within this phenomenological framework, hospitality is not caught in an aporia 
between the general and the singular, the conditional and the unconditional; rather, 
it constitutes a site of dispute between conflicting configurations of the shared world.
Key words: HOSPITALITY; COMMUNITY; RESPONSIBILITY; DERRIDA; HEI-
DEGGER; ARENDT 
Resumen: En la reflexión de Derrida sobre la hospitalidad, las figuras de Edipo y Antí-
gona desempeñan un papel decisivo. Derrida describe a Edipo como anomos, un pros-
crito, ya que transgrede a los nomos establecidos. Según Derrida, tanto Edipo como 
Antígona están implicados en una tensión irresoluble entre la hospitalidad condicio-
nal e incondicional. Una mirada más cercana a la Antígona de Sófocles, sin embargo, 
encaja mal con esta comprensión de la relación entre la hospitalidad y los nomos. 
Discutiendo contra Derrida, propongo una lectura fenomenológica de las acciones de 
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Antígona como un intento de revelar su sufrimiento a la comunidad. De esta manera, 
ella exige hospitalidad no por ella misma ni por su padre infinitamente retirado, sino 
por la revelación mundial que ella encarna. Dentro de este marco fenomenológico, la 
hospitalidad no está atrapada en una aporía entre lo general y lo singular, lo condicio-
nal y lo incondicional; más bien, constituye un sitio de disputa entre configuraciones 
en conflicto del mundo compartido.
Palabras clave: HOSPITALIDAD; COMUNIDAD; RESPONSABILIDAD; DERRI-
DA; HEIDEGGER; ARENDT
The concept of hospitality is tied up with the issues of responsibi-
lity, community, and law. To whom are we responsible and how? Who can 
we accommodate within our community? Which laws should govern our 
practices of hospitality? On the one hand, we can easily make a general 
rule about asylum and we can easily write a code of conduct that imposes 
rights and obligations upon the hosts and guests alike. On the other hand, 
such rules are easily broken, and what do we do with those who show up 
anyway and those who have no respect for the code of conduct? And, im-
portantly, who is this “we,” if not people who have themselves previously 
arrived and, most likely, broken a code of conduct, when they did?
As a philosophical issue, the theme of hospitality became promi-
nent through the work of Enmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, but it 
has been central in Western culture since antiquity (which is not to say 
that hospitality is a Western phenomenon even if it as a Western con-
cept). In this paper, I will concern myself with both of these traditions by 
establishing a dialogue between Derrida and Sophocles about the issue of 
hospitality. I will consider Derrida’s interpretation of hospitality and how 
it relates to the issues of responsibility, community, and law by focusing 
on his reading of Oedipus and Antigone in Of Hospitality, before allowing 
(or perhaps forcing) Sophocles to reply to Derrida.
I will argue that Derrida’s deconstructive logic of hospitality, as 
he unfolds it in his reading of Oedipus at Colonus, fits poorly with Anti-
gone, which renders itself much more easily to a phenomenological rea-
ding. Drawing upon Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, I thus develop 
a contrasting logic of hospitality according to which Antigone is not the 
embodiment of an aporetic tension between the singular and the general 
but committed to overturning the laws that govern the political space of 
appearances. According to Derrida, Antigone weeps because she is denied 
mourning and allocated to a singular position outside of the social order, 
whereas I take her to see that things could be different and that her dead 
father/brother could be made visible within the shared space of appearan-
ces.
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What will emerge in my interpretation of the play is a conception 
of hospitality as a site of contestation and conflict, i.e., hospitality as a 
possible transgression and transfiguration of the law and of the conven-
tions of a given social order. In this sense, I will not provide answers to 
the questions about who or what should be welcomed but address hospita-
lity ontologically as the movement that disturbs the law or nomos, that is 
always marked by its fragility.
1. Derrida’s Wandering Oedipus and Weeping Antigone
In his interpretation of hospitality, Derrida focuses on how Oedi-
pus after fleeing Thebes and gauging out his eyes to bear the shame of his 
destiny, arrives in Colonus as a blind stranger. Oedipus knows not where 
he is and has to rely on his daughter Antigone to inquire about their whe-
reabouts. Antigone serves as his guide and link to the realm of human 
affairs. 
Before Antigone gets the chance to ask someone, the two wande-
rers are approached by a local, who asks them to move, since they are 
currently resting on sacred ground, where no mortal is supposed to dwell. 
Oedipus and Antigone, who were once part of the royal family in Thebes 
and therefore those who determined the law – Oedipus was, after all, a 
Tyrannus – have become strangers and trespassers, ignorant of local law 
and custom. Even before they get to address the local authorities – even 
before they get to establish an intersubjective relation to an embodiment 
of the state – they encounter or transgress a local border, a demarcation 
or limit. They are already infiltrated into the local nomos, which means 
not only law, but also border. It is of some interest that they encounter 
the law before they encounter the authorities, since this reveals that what 
they are up against are not merely an intersubjective relation (whether 
one of recognition or one of empathy) but rather the kind of anonymous 
and historically sedimented sociality that makes up a world. This tension 
between the intersubjective and the social, the singular and the general 
comes to characterize the issue of hospitality as such. How do we accom-
modate those who arrive and transgress our borders? Can we make excep-
tions for those who do now know, or does this threaten the very generality 
of the law?
Oedipus, on his part, refuses to move from his seat on the sacred 
land, since he finds it strangely fitting that he should coincidentally find 
a resting place on the sacred land of the Eumenides – the goddesses of 
vengeance, those “who see everything” (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000, 
p. 37; Sophocles, 1998b, l. 42).
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At this time, numerous villagers have gathered around Oedipus 
and Antigone, and they agree that even if the foreigners trespass, they 
will not remove them by force. Instead, they start to question Oedipus as 
to how he was blinded, what his lineage is, and so on. The Chorus, quickly 
recognizes the tale of King Oedipus, which they have all heard in advance.
Later on, Theseus, the lord of Colonus, arrives. He too has heard 
the tragic rumors about Oedipus. Theseues himself has suffered in exile 
and therefore he immediately takes pity on Oedipus and offers him hos-
pitality:
Dire indeed must be the fortune which you tell, for me to stand aloof from it; since I know that I 
myself also was reared in exile, just as you, and that in foreign lands I wrestled with perils to my life, 
like no other man. Never, then, would I turn aside from a stranger, such as you are now, or refuse 
to help in his deliverance. For I know well that I am a man, and that my portion of tomorrow is no 
greater than yours. (Sophocles, 1998b, l. 560ff)
Responding to this, Oedipus puts forth a strange offer that is also 
a demand: In exchange for hospitality, he offers Theseus his own body and 
says that it must be buried on his land, where it is said that it will bring 
Theseus and his descendants luck in the war against Thebes that will 
inevitably be triggered by their offer of hospitality. The only condition for 
this protection is that Oedipus’ site of burial is kept secret.
Three elements in this tale are crucial for Derrida’s reading: (1) the 
relation between he law and Oedipus, who is an outlaw (an anomos), and 
(2) the oath of secrecy that Oedipus imposes upon Theseus. In addition 
to this, we will have to consider (3) the way that Antigone mourns her 
father’s death and – especially – how she mourns not knowing where her 
father is buried.
1.1 Nomos Anomos
The hospitality showed towards Oedipus’ transgresses, quite lite-
rally, the nomos of Colonus. He dwells where no mortal is supposed to 
dwell, and yet they welcome him. We could read this as an instance of 
what Derrida calls unconditional hospitality as opposed to conditional 
hospitality. Derrida sees in the very concept of hospitality an unsolvable 
aporia between the law (in singular) of hospitality and the laws (in plural) 
of hospitality: 
It is as though hospitality were the impossible: as though the law of hospitality defined this very 
impossibility, as if it were only possible to transgress it, as though the law of absolute, unconditio-
nal, hyperbolic hospitality, as through the categorical imperative of hospitality commanded that we 
transgress all the laws (in the plural) of hospitality, namely, the conditions, the norms, the rights 
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and the duties that are imposed on hosts and hostesses, on the men or women who give a welcome 
as well as the men or women who receive it. And vice versa, it is as though the laws (plural) of hos-
pitality, in marking limits, powers, rights, and duties, consisted in challenging and transgressing the 
law of hospitality, the one that would command that the ‘new arrival’ be offered an unconditional 
welcome. (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000, p. 77)
The law of hospitality demands that we offer hospitality to whoe-
ver arrives and that we impose no demands upon them. The law of hos-
pitality demands that we offer unconditional hospitality to the stranger. 
The laws of hospitality, on the other hand, imposes conditions, norms, ri-
ghts and duties upon hosts and guests alike. It even determines whom we 
should offer hospitality in the first place (say, by making criteria for those 
who can apply for asylum). These two laws are irreconcilable and, yet, 
they require each other. The unconditional law of hospitality is the impul-
se that enables the conditional laws of hospitality, while the conditional 
laws of hospitality are necessary in order to realize the unconditional law 
(Derrida, 2002, p. 251; Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000, p. 79). The impe-
rative of hospitality demands that we transgress all laws, and therefore it 
is a “law without a law” (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000, p. 83). Derrida 
writes:
The law is above the laws. It is thus illegal, transgressive, outside the law, like a lawless law, nomos 
anomos, law above the laws and law outside the law (anomos, we remember, that’s for instance how 
Oedipus, the father-son, the son as father, father and brother of his daughters, is characterized). 
(Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000, p. 79)
Derrida invokes Oedipus at the very heart of this antinomy. Oedi-
pus, the anomos, represents the unconditional law of hospitality in light 
of which the instituted nomos must be transgressed. Nomos anomos is the 
disturbing movement caused by Oedipus’ arrival.
A little later, Derrida is reminded of the “written laws (…) that 
Antigone will have to transgress in order to offer her brothers the hospi-
tality of the land and of burial” (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000, p. 85). 
Not only is Oedipus anomos and opposed to the law, but so is Antigone, 
in a transitive way: Antigone becomes anomos because of her relations or 
commitments to the other anomoi (her brothers). We will return to this 
issue of transitivity, but before doing so, we must briefly look at the other 
elements in Derrida’s reading.
1.2 The Oath of Secrecy
In Oedipus at Colonus, the aporia between the nomos and the ano-
mos defines the relation between Theseus and Oedipus. This is evident, 
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when Oedipus makes Theseus swear not to reveal where he is buried. Oe-
dipus says to Theseus
Immediately, with no hand to guide me, I will lead to the place where I must die. 
But as to that place, never reveal it to another man, neither where it is hidden, nor 
in what region it lies, so that it may be an eternal defence for you, better than many 
shields, better than the spear of neighbors which brings relief. [1525] But as for mys-
teries which speech may not profane [ha d’ exagista mēde kineitai logō], you will learn 
them yourself when you come to that place alone, since I cannot declare them either 
to any of these people, or even to my own children, though I love them. (Sophocles, 
1998b, l. 1520-1530)
Oedipus’ tomb is to be kept secret for everyone except Theseus – 
including his own children. It is important to note how this place, where 
Oedipus goes to die, resists speech; it, literally, cannot be moved by logos. 
In this sense, Oedipus marks his distance to the realm of human affairs. 
His site of burial cannot be manifested, it cannot be talked about, and it 
must remain a secret.
This secret is entrusted to Theseus. Or, rather, it is imposed on 
him: Theseus – who offered unconditional hospitality – is forced to accept 
an oath of secrecy, because only if he keeps this oath will his city prosper. 
If he fails the gods will punish him (Sophocles, 1998b, l. 1534-1538). This 
oath is thus backed up with a promise that is also a threat. As Derrida 
notes, Theseus “does not see himself tied by an oath he would have spon-
taneously proffered, but by an oath [orkos] to which he has found himself 
– yes, found – unsymmetrically committed” (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 
2000, p. 107). The best host imaginable becomes an eternal hostage to this 
guest who is about to die.
For Derrida this is crucial, since the secrecy and encryption of Oe-
dipus within the realm [nomos] of Theseus echoes the aporia between the 
unconditional law of hospitality and the conditional laws of hospitality. 
The oath of secrecy is what makes the aporia endure. The only way to 
accommodate the anomos, of being hospitable to him, is through secrecy. 
The reasoning is this: since if Theseus were to make the unconditional law 
of hospitality manifest, if he were to make it publicly known and official, 
the conditional nomos would be overthrown. This is the case since Oedipus 
promises that Colonus will prosper if Theseus keeps his oath but thereby 
also implicitly threatens that if Theseus fails to do so Colonus will suffer 
the wrath of the Gods. This promise/threat can also be subjected to a more 
pragmatic interpretation: If a community were to publicly announce that 
it follows the law of unconditional hospitality, the limited sphere of its 
ethos, its specific way of life, would quickly succumb due to the unlimited 
responsibility towards everyone. Accordingly, we can see that there is only 
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one way to keep the aporia at bay (though not to solve it), namely, to keep 
the unconditional law a secret, to encrypt it within the very heart of the 
nomos itself, as a law that cannot be publicly manifested.
The laws are thus maintained by hiding the anomos within, while 
the anomos can only remain anomos by a secret accommodation within 
the nomos. This is why Oedipus can have no proper grave, at least if we 
follow Derrida.
1.3 Mourning
Finally, we can turn to the character of Antigone. We have already 
mentioned that Derrida sees Antigone as an expansion of this logic of the 
anomos; that she too is anomos when she transgresses the laws in Thebes. 
But before we can turn to this transgression, we must see how she res-
ponds to Oedipus’ transgression and encryption, that is, we must see how 
Oedipus’ state of being anomos is, arguably, transitive and that Antigone 
too becomes anomos by responding to her father’s encryption.
Oedipus at Colonus ends with Antigone in tears; she laments her 
dead father, but not only this. She weeps over the very secrecy imposed on 
Theseus; she mourns that Oedipus has not received a proper burial, and 
that she cannot, hence, mourn him properly (Sophocles, 1998b, l. 1705-
1714). As Derrida puts it, Antigone
weeps at not weeping, she weeps a mourning dedicated to saving tears. For she does, in fact, weep, 
but what she weeps for is less her father, perhaps, than her mourning, the mourning she has been 
deprived of, if we can put it like that. She weeps at being deprived of a normal mourning. She weeps 
for her mourning, if that is possible. (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000, p. 111)
Lacking a site of burial where her mourning can take place, the 
death of her father has, in a certain sense, been denied Antigone. She 
cannot experience him as dead. Without even a grave, he is now truly 
absent within the human realm. In the hidden crypt, his death is not pre-
sent, accessible and, hence, grievable. For Derrida, this reveals the struc-
tural impossibility of mourning. In mourning, the one who mourns seeks 
to appropriate the dead, to internalize them, but if this were to succeed the 
dead would be stripped of their alterity, of their infinite exteriority, and, 
hence, lost for good (Derrida, 2003). Antigone’s mourning is exemplary of 
this logic because she, being denied a place of mourning for her father, is 
left solely with his bare singularity. Lacking a grave, Oedipus seems to be 
doubly absent—he is not only dead, but his death itself is strangely absent.
This means that Antigone cannot see Oedipus as dead. The empha-
sis on sight or lack thereof is important. Antigone begs her dead and ab-
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sent father to see her weeping: “With these weeping eyes, father, I lament 
you” (Sophocles, 1998bl. 1709). In Derrida’s words: “[S]he asks him to see 
her weeping, to see her tears. The tears say that the eyes are not made 
primarily for seeing but for crying” (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000, p. 
113ff). The secrecy of Oedipus the anomos denies Antigone the community 
of mourning; it makes her unable to give her father a place in the shared 
world, and this is, perhaps, the worst destiny of all. On this reading, then, 
Antigone embodies a politics of weeping, since her tears bear witness to 
the aporia of the political community and its laws. Her grief has no place, 
and this marks her as being without nomos, without law, limits, place, and 
community. “[T]here remains but one route for Antigone, suicide” (Derrida 
& Dufourmantelle, 2000, p. 117), as Derrida concludes.
2. Antigone’s Contestation of the Secret
Derrida’s conclusion is, however, too hasty, and the logic of hospi-
tality – of the relation between the law and that which is outside it – is not, 
I will argue, simply aporetic. Making this argument, I will, pace Derrida, 
not restrict myself to Oedipus at Colonus but also take Antigone into con-
sideration. The reason is that in the third Theban play, Antigone speaks 
and acts in a way that puts Derrida’s reading of her into question. At this 
point she is no longer simply lamenting her father’s choice but actively 
contesting it as well as the laws that made it necessary. A closer look at 
her actions will provide us with a different understanding of the political 
conflict at the heart of hospitality.
2.1 The Social Ontology of Burials
The first thing we ought to note is that we wander from one de-
nied burial to the next. Antigone returns to Thebes, where she finds her 
brothers’ dead, killed by each other in civil war. King Creon decrees that 
Polynices is not to be buried, because he turned against his city and sought 
to overthrow his brother Eteocles and Creon himself. Antigone thus goes 
directly from Oedipus’ encryption without a tomb to Polynices’ corpse that 
lies rotting outside the city gates.
In fact, the significance of a proper burial is one of the guiding 
themes of the play, and the lack thereof is constantly invoked as a cause 
of excessive grief. A guard thus reports that Antigone cried like an ani-
mal when she saw the naked and exposed body of Polyneices (Sophocles, 
1998a, l. 384). As we have already seen, Antigone mourned not only the 
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death of her father but even more so the fact that she is bereaved of mour-
ning him properly since he has no identifiable tomb. This pattern repeats 
itself all throughout Antigone:
First of all, Creon decrees, literally, that Polyneices should to be 
denied mourning [kokusai] and remain unburied [athapton] (Sophocles, 
1998a, l. 204-205). Antigone echoes this double determination word for 
word, when she tries to convince Ismene to help her. As she says, they 
cannot permit the dishonor of leaving Polyneices unwept [aklauton] and 
unburied [ataphon] (Sophocles, 1998a, l. 29).
Secondly, towards the end of the play, Creon punishes the disobe-
dience of Antigone by condemning her to death – without a tomb, of course. 
As Creon puts it, she is to be hidden [krupso] alive in a place that is deser-
ted [agon eremos] and unvisited by mortals [broton] (Sophocles, 1998a, l. 
773-774). Not only must she die, but she must do so in isolation, removed 
from the community. Like her father, she is to be encrypted. On the way 
to her lonely death chamber, this is what Antigone mourns. She does not 
lament the very fact that she is going to die, at least not primarily. Rather, 
what causes her pain is her exclusion from the community, that her place 
in the shared world has been denied: 
Ah, spring of Dirce, and you holy ground of Thebes whose chariots are many, you, at least, will 
bear me witness how unwept by loved ones [hoia philōn aklautos], and by what laws [nomois] I go 
to the rock-closed prison of my unheard-of tomb [taphou potainiou]! Ah, misery! I have no home 
[metoikos] among mortals [brotois] or with the shades [nekrois], no home [metoikos] with the living 
[zosin] or with the dead [thanousin]. (Sophocles, 1998a, l. 839-850)
Antigone mourns that no loved ones will mourn her and that no one 
will ever hear about her tomb. In this sense, it is possible to argue that she 
has already died, despite the fact that she is still walking. Embodying a 
liminal position, where she is biologically alive but dead to the community, 
she describes herself as a stranger or an alien resident [metoikos], who be-
longs nowhere. Antigone repeats this almost obsessively before her death: 
in just a few pages, we hear Antigone mourn that she is cursed [talaiphron 
(l. 866, 876)], unmarried [agamos (l. 867), alektos (l. 917)], unwept [aklau-
tos, (l. 876)], a stranger [metoikos (l. 850, 867)], without friends to mourn 
her [aphilos (l. 876), oudeis philon stenazei (l. 882), erēmos pros philōn (l. 
919))], denied rituals [anumenaion (l. 917)].
This inscribes the burial into a rich social nexus: The lack of burial 
is equivalent to deriving Antigone of friends, of rendering her strange, of 
denying her a relation of belonging. What she mourns is not just death but 
social death – that she has been denied the social dimension of her life. 
She simply has no place in the shared world. The same thing goes for Oe-
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dipus and for Polyneices – the horror of their destinies is not that Antigone 
loses them to death, but that they disappear from the shared world.
In this sense, Derrida is right when he emphasizes the difference 
between the crypt (or the encryption) and the tomb:
What this [Oedipus’] death is, is the becoming-foreign. For in death, the visibility of the tomb 
would have been able to signify a sort of repatriation for him. No, here, the dead one remains all 
the more foreign in a foreign land in that there is no manifest grave, no visible and phenomenal 
tomb, only a secret burial, an ungrave invisible even to his family, even to his daughter. (Derrida & 
Dufourmantelle, 2000, p. 113) 
The tomb provides a place in the shared world; it functions within 
the nomos and makes not only the dead visible for the community but also 
functions as an anchor point of those, who have been left behind. It gives 
them a place to remember (and thus make the dead present once again), 
a place to gather, and even comes with certain commitments and obliga-
tions. Without a tomb, it is as if the dead never lived.
The social ontological significance of the burial, however, shows 
us show Antigone – despite her own destiny – does not fit into Derrida’s 
logic of the anomos. While she mourns her exclusion, and mourns that 
she cannot be mourned, she has up to that point done everything in her 
power to provide a place for her father and thus to render him anything 
but anomos.
2.2 Manifestation and Secrecy: A Battle of Vision
It is important to note the ambiguity of Antigone’s kinship rela-
tions and how her references to her brother could just as well refer to Oe-
dipus as to Polynices. We see an example of this instability in a discussion 
with Creon, where Antigone describes how biological death is not a cause 
of grief for her, but only the social death that is the result of a lack of pro-
per burial:
But if I am to die before my time, I count that a gain. When anyone lives as I do, surrounded by 
evils, how can he not carry off gain by dying? So for me to meet this doom is a grief of no account. 
But if I had endured that my mother’s son should in death lie an unburied [athapton] corpse, that 
would have grieved me. (Sophocles, 1998a, l. 461-468)
The son of Antigone’s mother refers to both Polynices and to Oe-
dipus. In this sense there is a substitution at play: She could not bury 
Oedipus, her brother and father, and as soon as she arrived in Thebes, she 
faced the unburied body of her brother Polynices. As she says, it would 
grieve her if her brother remained unburied, and, therefore, she makes it 
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her duty to bury him. In this sense, Oedipus and Polynices are interchan-
geable. So when she arrives in Thebes, she gets the chance to finally right 
the wrong that her father denied her, namely, that of burying him. From 
this point of view, Antigone disobeys her father’s last wish to the same 
extent that she disobeys Creon’s decree.
When she buries Polynices, Antigone symbolically buries Oedipus. 
Even in her explicit reasoning, these two deaths are intimately related. As 
she will later explain, she transgresses the law to do justice to her brother, 
since she cannot get a new one with her parents being dead. So while she 
explicitly states that she would do this for no one else (Sophocles, 1998a, l. 
909-912), her words ironically betray her and apply to Polyneices and Oe-
dipus alike. In burying her brother (whether Oedipus or Polyneices), Anti-
gone effectively contests Oedipus’ oath of secrecy. He requested to remain 
hidden and tombless, and this is exactly what Antigone will not allow.
Antigone reads as if her entire motivation is to avoid the logic in 
which Derrida seeks to inscribe her. She refuses to let Oedipus rest in his 
tombless grave, and she refuses to accept his oath of secrecy. This is evi-
dent from the first lines of the play, where Antigone performs a complete 
reversal of the oath of secrecy that Oedipus forced Theseus to accept. I am 
thinking of the moment, when Antigone tells Ismene of her plans to bury 
Polyneices and transgress Creon’s decree. Ismene thinks it is a bad idea 
that can only end in disaster. Instead, she comes with another suggestion:
Then at least disclose the deed [promenuses] to no one before you do it. Conceal it, instead, in 
secrecy [kruphe de keuthe] – and so, too, will I. (Sophocles, 1998a, l. 82-85)
Ismene suggests sticking with the Derridean logic of encryption 
and secrecy. Antigone violently rejects this:
No! Declare it [katauda]!  You will be far more hated for your silence [sigos], if you fail to proclaim 
these things to everyone [pasi kēruxēs]. (Sophocles, 1998a, l. 86-87)
Backed up with a threat (you will be hated!), Antigone commits 
Ismene to an oath of manifestation. Ismene must declare Antigone’s trans-
gression to everyone! There will be no secrecy here; everything must be 
illuminated.
This changes the relation to the nomos, as Creon also notes. She 
not only transgresses the law, she also boasts about it:
This girl was already practiced in outrage [hubrizein] when she overstepped the published laws. 
And, that done, this now is a second outrage [hubris], that she glories in it and exults in her deed. In 
truth, then, I am no man, but she is, if this victory rests with her and brings no penalty. (Sophocles, 
1998a, l. 480-485)
– 76 –
What challenges Creon’s authority, his law, is not the mere trans-
gression but the way that Antigone proclaims and manifests it. Creon will 
punish her severely not because of her crime but because of the oath of 
manifestation in light of which she acts. The problem is that she tries 
to make her crime a glory [kallunein: literally, to beautify it (Sophocles, 
1998a, l. 496)].
Creon sees in the exposure a threat to his authority. The mani-
festation of the transgression threatens to overthrow the nomos: Antigo-
ne’s claim (as Judith Butler (2000) points out it) reverses the roles of the 
powerful man and the silent woman. As in the case of Oedipus’ threat, the 
city is doomed if the secret and the transgression are revealed. Contrary 
to Derrida’s analysis, however, this is exactly the guiding principle of An-
tigone’s actions.
So, why is this decryption so dangerous? More specifically, what is 
the relation between Antigone’s oath of manifestation and the nomos? The 
problem is, of course, that the manifestation of the transgression appeals 
to the community and in this way, it undermines Creon’s authority. This 
becomes clear, when Antigone states that
Antigone: All here would admit that they approve, if fear did not grip their tongues. (Sophocles, 
1998a, l. 502-505)
Creon responds to this by saying:
Creon: You alone out of all these Thebans see it that way [horas]. (Sophocles, 1998a, l. 508)
This results in an almost childish dialogue where Creon and Anti-
gone simply contradict each other without offering any actual arguments:
Antigone: They do, too [horosi khoutoi], but for you they hold their tongues.
Creon: Are you not ashamed that your beliefs [phroneis] differ from theirs? (Sophocles, 1998a, l. 
509-510)
This strange exchange is, as I see it, really at the heart of the entire 
dispute. Creon and Antigone are not merely disagreeing about whether 
Polyneices should be buried or not. If, as I have argued, the burial is im-
planted in a larger social nexus (involving rituals, grievability, friendship 
and in the end community), this dialogue reveals that their dispute is not 
about an individual transgression versus the law; not about singularity as 
opposed to generality, as Derrida suggests. Antigone and Creon are cons-
tantly discussing the proper way of seeing things – it is all about the eyes 
[horas], the vision and the sight [*phantos], and phronesis which is, as we 
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remember from Aristotle, about the proper way of seeing things (Aristotle, 
1984, 1113a). For example, horror strikes Antigone when she sees the body 
her brother unburied and exposed (Sophocles, 1998a, l. 424). Similarly, 
when Antigone covers Polyneices with dust, he becomes unseen [ephanis-
to] from the perspective of the governing power (Sophocles, 1998a, l. 307). 
The conflict is thus a battle of vision – about who can make the Thebans 
see things in their way. “Are you not ashamed that your phroneis differ 
from that of the Thebans?”
So when Antigone mourns that she and her family are unwept, 
without rituals, friends and community, and that she is stranger, she is 
actually mourning that her way of seeing things have no resonance in 
the community (whether this is a fair assessment of things is, however, a 
separate issue). The oath of manifestation is concerned with the political 
phenomenological task of making the community see things in the right 
way, and this is at the heart of the conflict. Creon and Antigone offer us 
different configurations of the shared world. Should we see this body as 
something to be buried? This is not a cognitive task that demands delibe-
ration and calculation; Antigone’s demand is that we see it as she does im-
mediately. This is why it is crucial whether Antigone succeeds in making 
her transgression of the law appear glorious or beautiful – only by doing 
so, will she be able to provide a place for her family and her dead ancestors 
in the shared world, to mark them as significant and as part of the commu-
nity, to make people see the world in the same way as she does.
For these reasons I think Derrida’s claim that Antigone’s “eyes are 
not made primarily for seeing but for crying” (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 
2000, p. 115) is false. At the very least, the function of Antigone’s eyes 
changes: They are for seeing, and when she speaks, she does so in order to 
share her sight with the city. In a certain sense, she has not only vision, 
but a kind of hypervision in the same way that Heidegger claims that she 
is hypsipolis apolis, above the city and outside the city (Heidegger, 1983, 
1984): Her liminal position at the border of the community, her way of 
seeing things differently, has the potential to reconfigure or reattune the 
world of the polis.
So where Derrida’s weeping eyes reminds us of a secrecy that de-
nies relationality, that negates the social dimension of life and death, An-
tigone’s vision and her calls for manifestation affirms and potentially con-
figures this relationality and our sharing of the world.
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2.3 Autonomos and Metoikos
Creon understands the danger in this. He understands that a re-
configuration of the shared world, a different way of seeing things, will 
undermine his rule:
But there is no evil worse than disobedience [anarchias]. This destroys cities [poleis]; this overturns 
homes [oikous]; this breaks the ranks of allied spears into headlong rout. But the lives of men who 
prosper upright, of these obedience [peitarchia] has saved the greatest part. Therefore we must 
defend those who respect order [kosmoumenois], and in no way can we let a woman defeat us. 
(Sophocles, 1998a, l. 672-678)
Creon sees in Antigone’s public disobedience a political power that 
threatens to destroy the city under his rule, his arché. The defense and 
burial of Eteocles is thus a way of preserving a specific social order. Creon 
tries to position Antigone as a purely anarchistic impulse, as the opposite 
of arché and order with reference to her femininity that renders her unfit 
to rule. “While I live, no woman will rule [arxei],” as he proclaims (Sopho-
cles, 1998a, l. 525). These remarks, obviously, speak to Hegel’s gendered 
reading of the play, where the woman is consigned to the realm of the 
household, while the realm of the state is reserved for the man, but as 
we have seen, Antigone’s oath of manifestation defies this logic. Her true 
crime consists in the way that she enters the space of appearances. In this 
sense, we are wrong to see her as embodying an anarchistic impulse. By 
speaking her own truth and proclaiming the validity of her transgression, 
she is neither anomos nor anarchistic, neither opposed to the law nor to 
authority as such. As the chorus puts it, as she walks to her grave:
Then in glory and with praise you depart to that deep place of the dead, neither struck by wasting 
sickness, nor having won the wages of the sword. No, guided by your own laws [autonomos] and 
still alive, unlike any mortal before, you will descend to Hades. (Sophocles, 1998a, l. 817-822)
Antigone is not anomos, following a “law with a law,” but autono-
mos. She is following her own law, according to the chorus. It is important 
to note two things regarding this notion of autonomy.
First of all, it is not, strictly speaking, a law that is of her own ma-
king. It is not the result of a free rational decision in the Kantian sense, not 
pure and untainted by heteronomous forces and influences. In fact, Anti-
gone acts out of affection for her brother. She finds herself moved, gripped 
and overwhelmed by the sight of his unburied corpse, and this sight stri-
kes her as being improper, as an abomination, and as being at odds with 
divine justice. In this sense, the law is entirely heteronomous – it grips her 
from outside and forces her to act. Strictly speaking, her responsibility is 
not spontaneous. As Heidegger notes, Antigone’s choice consists merely in 
– 79 –
the way that she chooses to suffer her terrible and uncanny faith (Heideg-
ger, 1984, p. 127ff). She suffers the transgression. When Antigone refuses 
to listen to Ismene in the opening dialogue, she insists to follow her “own 
ill-counsel” [emou dysboulian], namely, “to suffer the terrible [pathein to 
deinon]” (Sophocles, 1998a, l. 95-96). She chooses to suffer; she chooses 
her own heteronomy, her own pathological reasoning, as we would say if 
we were to remain within a Kantian vocabulary (e.g., Kant, 1974, A133). 
Nevertheless, in choosing to suffer this transgression, Antigone makes it 
her law; she appropriates the affection that grounds her action and makes 
it her practical identity. In this way, the pathos gives her a sense of pur-
pose and comes to define who she is. Complicating any dichotomy between 
activity and passivity, we would have to say that Antigone suffers the law 
of her own action. What is heteronomous becomes autonomous.
It goes without saying that Derrida is acutely aware of the com-
plications that come along with the concept of autonomy and even argues 
that there is heteronomy at the very heart of autonomy. This is why he 
associates the instant of decision with madness: “It is a madness; a mad-
ness because such decision is both hyper-active and suffered [sur-active et 
subie], it preserves something passive, even unconscious, as if the deciding 
one was free only by letting himself be affected by his own decision and 
as if it came to him from the other” (Derrida, 2002, p. 255). Nonetheless, 
it seems to me that the conflation with madness cannot be quite right. 
When Derrida conflates the passivity and suffering that grounds action 
with madness, he also suggests that there is a hidden nucleus in action 
that is in principle unintelligible and absolutely singular. As we just saw, 
Antigone explicitly argues that she is not mad and that she has the right 
phronesis (Sophocles, 1998a, l. 308-310). Similarly, the oath of manifes-
tation is Antigone’s attempt to render the affective ground of her action 
publicly available, to share her way of seeing things.
Madness corresponds to a lack of phronesis, the blindness of not 
seeing things in the right way and in the same way as others, we will 
surely fail if we try to apply this logic to Antigone. Antigone sees, and 
she sees clearly albeit from a certain perspective. In this way, Antigone’s 
action is not mad and unconscious, not based on an unintelligible secret. 
Rather, we might say that her suffering is preconscious in the same way 
that Heideggerian affectivity [Befindlichkeit] is prior to conscious delibe-
ration. Her affection for and by her brother tears open her world, and her 
decision to suffer this affection is the way in which she becomes herself 
within the new situation that she suddenly finds herself in.2 At this point, 
[2] sFor a further comparison between Derrida’s and Heidegger’s concept of responsibility, see Francois 
Raffoul (2014).
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it is clear that Derrida imposes a logic upon Antigone that is too Abraha-
mic and Kierkegaardian, when he takes the nucleus of responsibility and 
action to be utterly silent. In Antigone, hospitality and law are intimately 
connected to logos and to its communicative power. To be sure, Antigone is 
no paradigm for communicative rationality, since she is neither concerned 
with providing sound inferences and sufficient reasons nor engaging in 
coercion-free discourse. Antigone’s reasoning is messy and resists forma-
lization, since it is raison d’être is, simply, to make her pathic experience 
manifest and, hence, to reconfigure the shared world.
Secondly, Antigone’s law is not autonomous in the sense of an in-
ternal happening. To say that she “chooses” it or that she chooses to suffer 
it, does not merely imply that she makes it her own individual will. Even 
this choice is intrinsically caught up with the space of appearances in the 
sense that it relies upon its resonance with the community. In an Aren-
dtian way, her action consists equally of “the beginning made by a single 
person and the achievement in which many join by ‘bearing’ and ‘finishing’ 
the enterprise, by seeing it through” (Arendt, 1958, p. 189). The exposure 
is thus not limited to the pathos that causes her to act in the first place but 
includes also the exposure to the community with which she must subse-
quently share her pathos. This marks another sense in which “[t]o do and 
to suffer are like opposite sides of the same coin” (Arendt, 1958, p. 190). 
That is to say, when Antigone chooses to suffer her destiny, her suffering 
has only just begun. It is still up to others to determine “who” she is, and 
in this sense, the success of her choice is not located within her but in the 
realm of human affairs in which her acts unfold.
Rather than being merely a psychological phenomenon, her law is 
inherently political and constitutes a site of contestation with Creon’s law. 
Her strangeness or her uncanniness, as Heidegger would put it, requires 
a return to the polis in the form of a reconfiguration of their shared world 
(Heidegger, 1984, p. 144). Antigone is autonomous, insofar as she appro-
priates the preconscious affection and identifies with it, but this process 
of appropriation and identification does not render her immune to others 
and further affection. Autonomy thus becomes a process, which is pre-
consciously initiated, responsibly taken up, and carried out among and 
by others. Antigone’s autonomous action thus depends on whether others 
come to see the world in the same way as her, whether they “act in concert” 
(Arendt, 1958, p. 244).
This relation between the transgression and the law is decisively 
different from that of Derrida’s for whom the crucial aspect is that Oedi-
pus remains a foreigner, who in his secret and invisible grave can resist 
any attempt at “appropriation” or “domestication.” Antigone’s oath of ma-
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nifestation shows us that her autonomy hinges on the way that it is recei-
ved by the Thebans, and in this sense, the task for her is to make them 
“suffer” or rather to share her suffering, her pathein, with them, in order 
to make them see.
It is true that she can only do so by sacrificing herself. But as we 
have seen, she has already accepted this loss: “But if I am to die before 
my time, I count that a gain” (Sophocles, 1998a, l. 461-468). In dying she 
finally succeeds in sharing her suffering with the city. The Thebans finally 
see things as she does, they see the urgency of raising tombs for her and 
her family, and they see the need for divine justice rather than Creon’s 
authority. Even if Antigone and her entire family die, we would also have 
to say that they acquire a place in the human realm through Antigone’s 
autonomy rendered visible by the tomb. Being mourned by the communi-
ty, they are finally offered hospitality.
3. Conclusion
I have contrasted Derrida’s deconstructive and aporetic conception 
of hospitality with a phenomenologically informed reading of Antigone 
that takes her to be less of an embodiment of mournful secrecy than a poli-
tical figure whose aim is to transform the law. Where Derrida sees Antigo-
ne as part of the same aporetic logic as Oedipus, i.e., as demanding uncon-
ditional hospitality in a way that resists public manifestation, I have read 
her as embodying a phenomenological impulse to make things manifest. 
I have done this by showing that the conflict between Creon and 
Antigone is, in essence, a conflict about how the community sees things, 
and thus a battle that revolves around how the world is shared. Contrary 
to many traditional readings, I do not believe that what is at stake in 
the play is a conflict between two different spheres (human/divine, pu-
blic/private) but rather two different modes of appearance, two different 
ways of being-in-the-world. I have suggested that the practical reasoning 
that drives Antigone is not concerned with private matters and that her 
ethical commitments exceed the realm of the family, and that we cannot 
understand her action if we do not understand how it is autonomous and 
yet something suffered. Drawing upon Heidegger and Arendt, I have su-
ggested that we should understand this in a dual sense: Firstly, Antigone 
suffers her action in the sense that it originates in the pathic experience 
of seeing her dead brother naked and exposed. This pathos reconfigures 
Antigone’s world and causes her to act as she does. Secondly, in order 
to endure and maintain this reconfiguration of the world, Antigone must 
share her pathos would the community and make them see things as she 
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does. While this is an act of autonomy, since Antigone comes to identify 
with the sense of purpose offered to her in the horrible sight of her dead 
brother, her action is neither caused by herself not entirely carried out by 
herself. If she cannot make the citizens of Thebes see things in her way, 
she fails. This is the reason that Creon and Antigone literally discuss to 
which extent Antigone’s actions are “beautiful” , how the citizens perceive 
them, and whether they share her phronesis.
Where Derrida tries to illuminate the figures of Oedipus and An-
tigone as inhabiting the aporetic tension of the law between the singular 
and the general, I have sought to understand the logic of hospitality in 
Antigone phenomenologically as a conflict between world disclosures. In 
contrast to Derrida’s politics of weeping, I have thus provided an admit-
tedly rough outline for a phenomenological politics of vision. Rather than 
understanding the issues of alterity and hospitality based on an infini-
te responsibility towards the other, we should think of them as ways in 
which the space of appearances becomes a site of conflict and dispute and, 
possibly, a site of social change. Conflicts of hospitality are not simply con-
flicts between the law and lawless individuals. They are, rather, conflicts 
between different ways of interpreting the shared world that can only be 
settled through resonance with the community at large.
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